Neither Israel nor Hamas will really win this war

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If there is a common theme to be found running through the series of shattering events that has irrevocably changed the Middle East since October 7 last year, it is that of dangerous fantasy leading to real-world tragedy.

When Hamas-led militants breached Israel’s border with Gaza on that fateful day and killed or kidnapped more than 1,400 Israelis – mostly civilians – many of them were hoping that such a shocking attack would inspire other militias in the region into action. The conceit that pitting a disparate collection of proxy groups against one of the Middle East’s most well-armed militaries and a hard-right Israeli government would result in Palestinian freedom is one marked by erroneous judgment.

Since that day, delusion has gripped all sides in this brutal and escalating conflict. Israel’s military response to October 7 was, its commanders said, to destroy Hamas. Instead, the collective punishment of Gaza’s population has claimed the lives of more than 41,800 people, according to Ministry of Health figures, although the true death toll could be much higher. Despite 12 months of bombardment and occupation – the latest of which was an air strike on a mosque on Sunday morning, killing at least 26 people and wounding dozens of others – Israeli forces have been unable to complete their stated objective.

For some in Israel’s political and military establishment, the war presented an opportunity to fulfil reckless ambitions of returning Jewish settlers to Gaza or changing the fragile status quo of religious sites in Jerusalem. The idea that occupying land can continue without consequence has taken hold.

Outside its borders, the past two weeks have revealed another questionable Israeli assumption: that assassinating enemy commanders in Beirut and Tehran, and invading another country will deliver security for its people. On the contrary, it has faced ballistic missiles from Iran, drone strikes from Yemen and international pressure to halt its campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. Meanwhile, domestic divisions fester as the fate of more than 100 remaining Israeli hostages hangs in the balance.

Much has changed in the past 12 months. Leading figures in the so-called Axis of Resistance, such as Hamas's Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah, are dead. As Israeli troops advance, about a million Lebanese have had to flee their homes, as have more than 100,000 Syrian refugees based in Lebanon. Tens of thousands of Israeli civilians, too, remain displaced from their country’s north.

The incoherence of US policy in this region – advocating for peace while supporting Israel politically and militarily – has been repeatedly exposed.

One thing is certain: whatever happens next, the Middle East as it was on October 6 last year is gone. This presents an unnerving and uncertain future, but the gravity of the situation is such that this may – with the right political will – be the time for a much-needed reality check.

This means dispensing with the ultimate delusion – that victory can be achieved by removing either Israelis or Palestinians from the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.

Fantasies of expelling populations, occupying and settling land for decades, or building security on a system of dispossession and discrimination are too dangerous to be allowed to continue. Delusion and miscalculation have led to many needless deaths, from Israelis and others on October 7 to Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank over the past 12 months and now Lebanese civilians all the way up to Beirut and beyond.

It is well past time for warring sides to search for solutions and peace. That means immediately ending the war in Gaza, winding down regional escalation and rejoining the path of diplomacy and long term co-existence. The alternative is to cling to radical beliefs about ultimate victory. If the past year has shown us anything, it is that there are no such victories to be had in this conflict – that is reality.