As the Syrian uprising evolved into full-blown warfare, and as it now winds its way towards an apparently inevitable denouement, so US policy has struggled to adapt. Donald Trump's initial instincts – and tweets – that the US would pull out of Syria have been reversed, but the precise direction is not yet clear.
America's Syria policy appears to be formulated somewhere between the White House and the State Department. Since John Bolton came in as National Security Adviser earlier this year and Jim Jeffrey was appointed as the State Department's special representative for Syria last month, a new policy appears to be taking shape.
Both have publicly declared that the estimated 2,000 US troops inside Syria will not leave "as long as Iranian troops are outside Iranian borders", as Mr Bolton put it at the United Nations General Assembly. Mr Jeffrey later said that US troops would not leave before the end of this year and also promised "a more active approach" inside Syria. Taken together, these comments reverse Mr Trump's assertions, made as recently as April this year, that he would withdraw from Syria.
The policy, while evolving, does offer a specific direction of travel and a broadly clear goal: to roll back Iran's influence inside Syria and ensure that Iranian forces leave Syrian territory. The only problem is that Iran has spent years preparing for precisely that eventuality. Iran's policy inside Syria has been configured to retain influence, even after the last Iranian soldier goes home.
From the very beginning of the war, Tehran has sought to embed its fighters and those of its allies into the conflict.
For the Iranian regime, the idea has been to find ways to defuse its influence and ideology across society, rather than maintain it in a top-down, single chain of command. That makes it much harder to destroy.
Iran, with a large military and developed intelligence agencies, as a centre of Shia Islam and as a country with extensive links to Iraq and Lebanon, was always going to be in a position to influence Syria's Shia population culturally, religiously and militarily. All it needed was the appropriate opening.
Tehran sent advisers as early as 2011, during the early period of the uprising, and Iranian fighters were on the ground in Syria from at least 2012, around the same time as Hezbollah began to become covertly involved.
Since 2013, Hezbollah's influence has been open and a fortnight ago, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah used a speech to warn that “no one can force us to leave Syria” and that Hezbollah would stay in the country indefinitely.
But Hezbollah is only the largest of the foreign militias in Syria. Iran has used the Syrian conflict as an opportunity to create further Shia militias, in the way that it did in Iraq after the 2003 invasion.
The links between these groups and the complexity of their chains of command are bewildering. Some are directed from Damascus, others from Tehran, others still have close ties to Hezbollah or even to the Shia miltias of Iraq.
Some of the larger groups, such as the Abbas Brigade, have splintered off into smaller militias inside Syria. Others, such the Zulfiqar Brigade, appear to have links with organisations abroad, especially in Iraq.
Researchers have tried to uncover the groups and their affiliations through social media posts, photographs of soldiers and officers, symbols, flags, names and even funeral notices. But in the fast-moving war, when affiliations and alliances shift rapidly, the dynamics are fiendishly difficult to unravel.
What is certain is that, with overlapping personnel, commanders and fighters drawn from diverse countries (Iran has recruited Shia fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan) and many Syrian fighters swapping sides, it is almost impossible to distinguish between Syrian and Iranian groups. Similarly it is difficult to determine who is taking orders from Damascus and who is taking orders from Tehran, or between those who pledge allegiance to one but remain influenced by the other. It is difficult to know who the Iranian militias are, let alone if they have gone home.
Beyond the military sphere, Tehran has also found other ways to exert influence.
Since at least 2012, under the guise of relocating families to more secure areas, Iran and the regime have swapped populations inside Syria along sectarian lines. The best-known has been the relocation of Sunni Muslims from the Damascus suburb of Zabadani to the northern villages of Foua and Kefraya, just outside Idlib. Similar numbers of Shia Muslims from those villages were brought to Zabadani.
Other populations have also been switched, particularly around important Shia shrines, such as the Sayyidah Zaynab mosque in Damascus. Shia families, reportedly including Iraqis and Lebanese, have been relocated to the area.
The aim appears to be to secure Syria south of Homs, meaning the coastal cities and the area between the capital and the Lebanese border. By ensuring Shia demographic supremacy in this area, both Iran – which is one of the two centres of the Shia faith – and the regime, which is drawn predominantly from Alawite Shias, hope to insulate themselves while also protecting Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Taken together, these links create a spider's web of influence across Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Iran not only has direct influence with the Assad regime in Damascus, it also has influence on militias that Damascus ostensibly controls, on Hezbollah, which itself has influence with Damascus and on Shia Syrians, through its power as a centre of religious learning.
Thus, even if the last Iranian soldier is forced home, Tehran will still be able to sway Damascus. Iran will not need to keep any of its fighters in Syria to retain influence in the country indefinitely.
The smuggler
Eldarir had arrived at JFK in January 2020 with three suitcases, containing goods he valued at $300, when he was directed to a search area.
Officers found 41 gold artefacts among the bags, including amulets from a funerary set which prepared the deceased for the afterlife.
Also found was a cartouche of a Ptolemaic king on a relief that was originally part of a royal building or temple.
The largest single group of items found in Eldarir’s cases were 400 shabtis, or figurines.
Khouli conviction
Khouli smuggled items into the US by making false declarations to customs about the country of origin and value of the items.
According to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, he provided “false provenances which stated that [two] Egyptian antiquities were part of a collection assembled by Khouli's father in Israel in the 1960s” when in fact “Khouli acquired the Egyptian antiquities from other dealers”.
He was sentenced to one year of probation, six months of home confinement and 200 hours of community service in 2012 after admitting buying and smuggling Egyptian antiquities, including coffins, funerary boats and limestone figures.
For sale
A number of other items said to come from the collection of Ezeldeen Taha Eldarir are currently or recently for sale.
Their provenance is described in near identical terms as the British Museum shabti: bought from Salahaddin Sirmali, "authenticated and appraised" by Hossen Rashed, then imported to the US in 1948.
- An Egyptian Mummy mask dating from 700BC-30BC, is on offer for £11,807 ($15,275) online by a seller in Mexico
- A coffin lid dating back to 664BC-332BC was offered for sale by a Colorado-based art dealer, with a starting price of $65,000
- A shabti that was on sale through a Chicago-based coin dealer, dating from 1567BC-1085BC, is up for $1,950
UAE currency: the story behind the money in your pockets
Key facilities
- Olympic-size swimming pool with a split bulkhead for multi-use configurations, including water polo and 50m/25m training lanes
- Premier League-standard football pitch
- 400m Olympic running track
- NBA-spec basketball court with auditorium
- 600-seat auditorium
- Spaces for historical and cultural exploration
- An elevated football field that doubles as a helipad
- Specialist robotics and science laboratories
- AR and VR-enabled learning centres
- Disruption Lab and Research Centre for developing entrepreneurial skills
Teams
Pakistan: Sarfraz Ahmed (captain), Mohammad Hafeez, Sahibzada Farhan, Babar Azam, Shoaib Malik, Asif Ali, Shadab Khan, Shaheen Shah Afridi, Usman Khan Shanwari, Hasan Ali, Imad Wasim, Faheem Ashraf.
New Zealand: Kane Williamson (captain), Corey Anderson, Mark Chapman, Lockie Ferguson, Colin de Grandhomme, Adam Milne, Colin Munro, Ajaz Patel, Glenn Phillips, Seth Rance, Tim Seifert, Ish Sodhi, Tim Southee, Ross Taylor.
if you go
The flights
Air Astana flies direct from Dubai to Almaty from Dh2,440 per person return, and to Astana (via Almaty) from Dh2,930 return, both including taxes.
The hotels
Rooms at the Ritz-Carlton Almaty cost from Dh1,944 per night including taxes; and in Astana the new Ritz-Carlton Astana (www.marriott) costs from Dh1,325; alternatively, the new St Regis Astana costs from Dh1,458 per night including taxes.
When to visit
March-May and September-November
Visas
Citizens of many countries, including the UAE do not need a visa to enter Kazakhstan for up to 30 days. Contact the nearest Kazakhstan embassy or consulate.
Our family matters legal consultant
Name: Hassan Mohsen Elhais
Position: legal consultant with Al Rowaad Advocates and Legal Consultants.
Killing of Qassem Suleimani
The Uefa Awards winners
Uefa Men's Player of the Year: Virgil van Dijk (Liverpool)
Uefa Women's Player of the Year: Lucy Bronze (Lyon)
Best players of the 2018/19 Uefa Champions League
Goalkeeper: Alisson (Liverpool)
Defender: Virgil van Dijk (Liverpool)
Midfielder: Frenkie de Jong (Ajax)
Forward: Lionel Messi (Barcelona)
Uefa President's Award: Eric Cantona
Mercer, the investment consulting arm of US services company Marsh & McLennan, expects its wealth division to at least double its assets under management (AUM) in the Middle East as wealth in the region continues to grow despite economic headwinds, a company official said.
Mercer Wealth, which globally has $160 billion in AUM, plans to boost its AUM in the region to $2-$3bn in the next 2-3 years from the present $1bn, said Yasir AbuShaban, a Dubai-based principal with Mercer Wealth.
“Within the next two to three years, we are looking at reaching $2 to $3 billion as a conservative estimate and we do see an opportunity to do so,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Mercer does not directly make investments, but allocates clients’ money they have discretion to, to professional asset managers. They also provide advice to clients.
“We have buying power. We can negotiate on their (client’s) behalf with asset managers to provide them lower fees than they otherwise would have to get on their own,” he added.
Mercer Wealth’s clients include sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and insurance companies among others.
From its office in Dubai, Mercer also looks after Africa, India and Turkey, where they also see opportunity for growth.
Wealth creation in Middle East and Africa (MEA) grew 8.5 per cent to $8.1 trillion last year from $7.5tn in 2015, higher than last year’s global average of 6 per cent and the second-highest growth in a region after Asia-Pacific which grew 9.9 per cent, according to consultancy Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In the region, where wealth grew just 1.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, a pickup in oil prices has helped in wealth generation.
BCG is forecasting MEA wealth will rise to $12tn by 2021, growing at an annual average of 8 per cent.
Drivers of wealth generation in the region will be split evenly between new wealth creation and growth of performance of existing assets, according to BCG.
Another general trend in the region is clients’ looking for a comprehensive approach to investing, according to Mr AbuShaban.
“Institutional investors or some of the families are seeing a slowdown in the available capital they have to invest and in that sense they are looking at optimizing the way they manage their portfolios and making sure they are not investing haphazardly and different parts of their investment are working together,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Some clients also have a higher appetite for risk, given the low interest-rate environment that does not provide enough yield for some institutional investors. These clients are keen to invest in illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.
“What we have seen is a desire for higher returns in what has been a low-return environment specifically in various fixed income or bonds,” he said.
“In this environment, we have seen a de facto increase in the risk that clients are taking in things like illiquid investments, private equity investments, infrastructure and private debt, those kind of investments were higher illiquidity results in incrementally higher returns.”
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, said in its 2016 report that has gradually increased its exposure in direct private equity and private credit transactions, mainly in Asian markets and especially in China and India. The authority’s private equity department focused on structured equities owing to “their defensive characteristics.”
