The key to tackling climate change is not what we think

The mood around Cop30, the UN climate change summit in Belem, Brazil, is distinctly sombre. Is that justified or tactical manoeuvring by the numerous activists and lobbyists among the 50,000 attendees that have descended on the modest Amazon city?

The answer lies in assessing progress since Cop21 in Paris in 2015. All recent reports agree on salient insights that should hearten the Belem delegates. Although absolute volumes of greenhouse gases are at record level, carbon dioxide emission growth has slowed from 1.7 per cent annually in the decade before Paris to 0.3 per cent afterwards. Its peak is now projected in 2030, with some suggestions that emissions could already be declining.

Similar downward trends are evident with the more lethal (in terms of global heating) greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as methane, nitrous oxide and fluorocarbons. If this continues through the gathering momentum of actions under way, total GHGs would reduce by 2035 to a level compatible with 1.5°C warming above pre-industrial levels, well short of the catastrophic 2°C red-lighted in Paris.

Thus, the breaching of 1.5°C by a marginal 0.05 °C in 2024 – the warmest year on record – is serious but does not spell imminent doom. The limit will be breached again in coming years but is reversible during the next decade if GHG reduction is sustained.

These are no grounds for complacency because the latest Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) indicate an underwhelming 12 per cent reduction in GHG emissions by 2035 compared to 2019 levels, equating to planetary overheating by 2.6°C. That remains dire for the biosphere but is down from 3.6°C projected in 2015 and 3°C predicted in 2019. Every tenth of a degree of lessened warming is a victory for life over death.

So, how to square the dismal NDC-based temperature predictions with the sanguine GHG emission projections? NDCs are useful for action-focusing but governments are making less noisy promises to appease their fossil-fuel dissenters while quietly delivering more. It is shrewd politics not to pick quarrels that become obsolete with time.

Thus, Gulf states invest heavily in renewable energy and Europeans close their coal mines as traditional energy producers understand the writing on the wall after Cop28 in Dubai agreed to transition away from fossil fuels.

Of course, there is rearguard reaction by the “drill, baby, drill” movement in the US – the world’s second biggest GHG producer. And, although it intends to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, US decarbonisation proceeds in states where economics suggest that renewable energy is cheaper.

Meanwhile, it is understandable that other nations such as South Africa with tight finances are compelled to keep the lights on by squeezing the last kilojoule from their fossil-fuel assets. But their contribution to global GHG volumes is relatively small.

All through history, societal shifts have been driven by hard economics. So also here: the shifts under way are driven by innovation reducing the green premium for making clean energy available.

Meanwhile, China provides perfect illustration of the necessary co-existence of fossil fuels and renewables - for now. Its centrally planned economy is scaling-up renewables so fast that optimists think its fossil emissions have peaked. That is despite commissioning new coal-fired power plants, some of which may never be used, but are kept in reserve to ensure energy security.

Neighbouring Mongolia that prospered by exporting coal to China is diversifying to extract other minerals, especially copper and rare earths critical for renewable energy systems.

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative planned $160 billion in foreign assistance for coal-powered plants for 2014-2020. More than a third of this has been mothballed, as Chinese-made solar panels plaster rooftops from Pakistan to Nigeria, and solar drops to 20 per cent of coal-sourced energy.

China’s net zero target date of 2060 will be reached earlier, and what happens in the world’s biggest GHG emitter is of significance to the planet.

How is decarbonising China a compelling model for others? By doubling down on national development and continuing to lift millions out of poverty, it is turbo-charging both climate change mitigation and adaptation.

The logic is that although development progress and GHG emissions are closely correlated, the more developed a community, the more capable it gets to self-protect against climate-caused disasters and recovers better from them. It can also better afford low-carbon technologies for homes and transport that ultimately reduce GHG emissions.

As I write, a lump of coal rests on my desk – a memento from my father’s mining days in India – the world’s third largest GHG emitter. Born and bred in India’s poorest region, I still recall when electricity first reached our house. Fossil fuels put me on a prosperous trajectory through opening opportunities for education, nutrition, health care, livelihood and travel.

It is hypocritical, indeed unethical, to deny today’s poor the advancement we enjoyed because that would overdraw the global carbon budget. Low carbon development is much touted but disappoints in scale of application compared to the pace with which climate-induced environmental degradation is impoverishing millions through loss of livelihoods, diseases and food insecurity.

To avoid losing more public trust, we must honestly acknowledge that the next two decades will bring considerable misery and mortality.

Because although GHGs may trend downwards, absolute reduction and reversing ecological impacts will take longer. The challenge, therefore, is to protect planet and people as best as possible during the tough interim. The only way to do that is to combine increased decarbonisation with accelerated development because the latter is crucial to climate resilience.

Unfortunately, our globally agreed framework for sustainable development through 17 goals is faltering with barely a third of 169 targets on track to be achieved by 2030 and a fifth regressing below 2015 baselines. Over 800 million people – a tenth of humanity – remain trapped in extreme poverty.

There are several reasons for this including escalating politico-economic-cultural tensions and conflicts. But a key constraint is the $4 trillion annual development financing gap. Meanwhile, debt-servicing will reach $1.4 trillion by 2030 and foreign aid has already declined by a fifth.

Admittedly, the development sector including humanitarian relief is overdue for efficiency reforms. But even with greater localisation and cost-saving technologies, the resourcing gap remains too wide.

Meanwhile, climate advocates want huge volumes of dedicated financing and link this to contentious “climate justice” through reparations from high historic GHG emitters. Last year’s COP29 in Baku sought international financing of $1.3 trillion by 2035 while experts estimated that developing countries must spend $2.7 trillion annually.

Over the decades, the world has got richer with total nominal GDP exceeding $106 trillion in 2023. But global solidarity is not keeping pace. How much can developed nations provide when they must also provision their own climate needs and continue development and humanitarian aid, amidst restive domestic political contexts?

The plethora of at least 30 climate financing windows, including the Global Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund, Climate Investment Fund, Clean Technology Fund, Loss and Damage Fund, joined now by Brazil’s new forest fund raise transparency and efficiency concerns, considering transactional costs and criticism that billions of dollars are wasted.

Streamlining is essential. But the bigger trap is binary thinking with climate action pursuing its own path in parallel or sometimes at the expense of development. Despite evidence that the latter is the most effective, efficient, affordable and sustainable way to handle climate change.

Shifting from narrow climate-specific actions to wider climate-sensitive development will save more lives and realise true climate justice.