Where do US–Gulf relations stand after Israel’s strike on Doha?

Qatar and the other Arab Gulf states have acted with commendable restraint in response to Israel’s flagrant breach of Qatari sovereignty after Israel's government attacked the Hamas leadership based in Doha. In a menacing message to the Arab world, Israel said it would pursue "extremist" groups wherever they may be and will not tolerate any state hosting their leaders.

Indeed, Israel’s broader aim is to eliminate the Palestinian counterpart in any negotiations, whether for a ceasefire or a comprehensive settlement, particularly one based on the two-state solution. Qatar subsequently mobilised regional and international condemnation of Israel’s brazenness. It simultaneously safeguarded its security partnership with the US, despite the strategic alignment between US President Donald Trump's administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government based on three pillars:

The elimination of Hamas as a designated terrorist organisation; the rejection of a Palestinian state; and joint retaliation against the global momentum towards recognising Palestine at the UN, including punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority and expanded Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank.

Washington may tacitly have reservations about the extent of Israeli aggression in Gaza and its extension into Doha. The US and Israel, however, function as surrogates, each a device in the other’s calculus. This is the core dilemma facing Gulf states after the Doha attack.

Mr Trump did not distance himself from Israel’s objective, only from its failed operation on the territory of a US-allied state. Had Israel succeeded in assassinating Hamas leaders in Qatar, Mr Trump may well have celebrated the achievement. But since it failed, and he abhors failure, he saw no need to applaud the strike on Hamas leaders, especially given his earlier blanket support for Israel’s pursuit of Hamas and its destruction of the group’s leadership and infrastructure.

The presence of Hamas leaders in Turkey, a Nato ally of the US, triggered some concern in Mr Trump’s camp, given the rapport between Mr Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Israel, acutely aware of this personal bond and of Washington’s reliance on Turkey’s role in Syria, chose not to target Hamas operatives in Turkey.

Instead, Israel's leadership deemed it timely to deliver a stern message to Qatar: the era of hosting and backing Hamas must end, particularly as Doha continues to serve as mediator between Hamas and Israel in an increasingly protracted and complicated process.

Israel concluded that Mr Trump had grown weary of the drawn-out negotiations between Hamas and Israel, mediated by Qatar and Egypt. The Israeli leadership sensed that Mr Trump was ready to inform both mediators that his patience had worn thin and the time had come for decisive action.

Israel thus moved to shut down both Qatar’s mediation and hosting of Hamas. It sent an arrogant message to Qatar and a pointed warning to Egypt, the Gulf states and Turkey: there is no safe haven for Hamas or its leaders. Negotiations that placate Hamas are futile. And there will be no leniency for those waving the flag of the Palestinian Authority, neither in Gaza nor the West Bank nor at international forums.

Mr Trump’s silence in the face of Israel’s repeated threats against Qatar and other states hosting Hamas signals alignment and serves as a shield against any accountability for Israel’s actions, no matter how flagrant or unrestrained. Accordingly, the Trump administration refused to condemn Israel, even while selectively leaking hints of its supposed discomfort with Israeli behaviour.

The message from Washington to Qatar was twofold: yes to continued security co-operation, including hosting the largest US military base in the Gulf and maintaining shared security arrangements; but no to hosting the political or security leadership of Hamas or of any group that Washington considers extremist; no to extremism in Doha; and no to the entrenched extremism in Gaza perpetuated by these leaders. Doha listened closely and took note, wisely.

Gulf states understand the fundamental difference between their partnership with the US rooted in friendship and mutual security and America’s organic, ideological alliance with Israel.

But Gulf leaders also recognise that their strategic focus today is not belligerent, ideological or pan-Arab, but internal security and national development.

Diplomatically, the Gulf states have worked vigorously to mobilise international opposition to Israel’s brazen defiance of international and humanitarian law, all in pursuit of a biblical vision of Greater Israel. Yet, the primary obstacle to this diplomatic effort is not only Israel, but also the American policies that unconditionally back it.

One recurring question remains: who is using whom? Is the US using Israel as a proxy to achieve objectives; namely, the destruction of Islamic extremism as embodied by Iran and its proxies on one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other? Or is Israel exploiting Mr Trump’s America to realise its own ambitions in Gaza and the West Bank?

To simplify the answer, both are using each other to advance shared goals. They are united in their campaign against what they term “Islamic extremism”.

There is a divergence in the means they deploy but the common ground between US and Israeli goals runs deeper than their divergences. The US, unwilling to deploy its own troops, has delegated the war effort to Israel, funding and arming it unconditionally yet without boots on the ground.

What does all this mean for US–Gulf relations following the Israel’s assault against Qatari sovereignty? It means a reshuffling of the deck and a reassessment. Undoubtedly, the failed Israeli operation attacking Hamas leaders in Qatar was a blow to Israeli hubris, but it has not disrupted the core strategic objectives of the Trump administration or Netanyahu government.

Israel will not change its policies, neither towards Hamas and the future of Gaza, nor towards the Palestinian Authority and the fate of the West Bank. It has resolved to eliminate the Palestinian partner in negotiations and to obliterate any notion of a two-state solution. It has begun retaliatory measures against the imminent international drive to recognise the State of Palestine.

Those who bet on Mr Netanyahu’s fall or on Israeli elections reversing the state’s rejection of the two-state solution are clinging to pipe dreams, not reality. Israel, in large part, fully supports Mr Netanyahu’s brand of hard-line extremism. Yes, there is criticism over his willingness to sacrifice hostages, but there is also growing support for the so-called “Hannibal Doctrine,” that prioritises national security even at the expense of hostages.

It is not Mr Netanyahu alone who rejects the two-state solution and the idea of a Palestinian state, but the majority of Israel, backed by swathes of American policymakers. While global public opinion is swelling with anger and disgust at what Israel has become, emotions do not halt settlers’ bulldozers or blunt the weaponisation of starvation.

Nevertheless, the symbolic and political value of galvanising international support for Palestinian statehood is indisputable and deserves full encouragement and perseverance. But the cost of retaliation is high. Israel’s retaliation is happening on the ground, and that of the US takes the form of the Trump administration increasing its material support for Israel in response to the mobilisation at the UN.

European leaders are hesitant to provoke a confrontation with the Trump administration, just as the Arab states are with Israel. Thus, restraint and wisdom are essential not out of choice, but necessity, because recklessness is not an option. Wisdom demands a realistic and bold reassessment of the challenges ahead and thinking outside the box, not stunts and posturing, to end Palestinian suffering and halt Israeli brazenness.