Last month, France’s armed forces finished dismantling their bases in Senegal, the last West African country to have hosted a permanent French military presence. The withdrawal marked the final chapter of a French retreat from the region that began in Mali in 2022 and was followed by closures in Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger.
At first, the pressure on Paris seemed to have been driven by the rise of new rulers in the Sahel and their growing frustrations with the French regional counterterrorism operation called Barkhane. However, the momentum eventually extended beyond the Sahel to include countries such as the Ivory Coast, Gabon and Senegal. Paris now maintains only one permanent military outpost in Africa – in Djibouti.
From a French standpoint, this highlights the necessity to reduce the country’s global military footprint. Given the refocus on European security amid the war in Ukraine, France could no longer afford this costly presence. As one high-ranking defence official told me last month, “the Ukraine war leaves us no bandwidth for anything else”.
France is not the only western power to withdraw from the region. Since last September, the US military has also left Niger. Like Paris, Washington’s presence in Africa is now limited to a base in Djibouti.
The departure of western forces from the Sahel and surrounding countries builds on a shared regional desire to part ways with former colonial powers and chart their own trajectories. But even as they begin new chapters, new questions emerge for their governments.
There is little doubt that western forces failed to defeat terrorist groups based in the region. But without their support, local militaries have struggled to stem the rising tide of extremism, forcing their political masters to turn elsewhere for help. Enter Russia and Turkey, both of which are providing security assistance to these countries, although the nature and extent of their respective partnerships remain unclear.
Russia initially increased its footprint in Africa primarily through the deployment of the Wagner Group in countries like the Central African Republic, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. However, after a failed mutiny led by the group’s founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, against Moscow in August 2023, its influence has declined. Given the demands of the war in Ukraine, a surge in Russian troops in West Africa is unlikely. The Kremlin has instead sought to replace Wagner with a paramilitary group called the Africa Corps.
Meanwhile, Ankara’s ties with several West African countries have grown in earnest over the past three years, particularly in arms sales. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have procured the well-known Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone, and Turkey’s defence industry has delivered armoured vehicles and light attack aircraft to local militaries. While it isn’t clear what role the Turkish private security company Sadat is playing in the region, Ankara has acknowledged having negotiated access to a military base in Chad. Nonetheless, this does not amount to a robust deployment of troops.
In other words, even as the aforementioned West African countries are diversifying their respective security arrangements, these new partnerships do not compensate for the co-operation frameworks they once had with western countries like France and the US.
In addition to the uncertainties of security assistance, the cutting of US development aid is equally worrisome. The current US administration’s decision to close USAID has had direct implications for West Africa, where governments rely heavily on foreign aid. More than a third of government spending in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has traditionally come from international assistance.
The severe reduction of US support will undoubtedly affect the ability of these states to provide basic services. Underdevelopment and misgovernance are already fuelling the growth of terrorism in West Africa. For years, terrorist groups have found new recruits in the rural areas abandoned by local governments. For sure, the emphasis placed on military-centric responses by France and the US, through counterinsurgency operations, did not bring about enduring stability. But the inability of key West African governments to address the social and economic grievances of their populations perpetuates this predicament.
Today, all indicators point to an increase in terrorist attacks across West Africa.
In Burkina Faso, it is believed that groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS control 40 per cent of the territory. In Mali, military bases are constantly under attack from these groups. The rise of Jamaat Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin – a coalition of extremist factions that includes a local branch of Al Qaeda – reflects this trend. Though JNIM emerged in Mali, it now conducts operations across the region, including in Togo, Benin and the Ivory Coast. JNIM claimed more than 240 attacks in the first half of this year alone, double the number for the same period last year.
None of this bodes well for West Africa, which can now be considered the centre of terrorist operations worldwide. For now, governments in the West and the Middle East may consider this to be a regional issue, and one that does not affect their security interests. However, history teaches us that the collapse of governance and the unchecked rise of terrorism in one region eventually spreads to others.
The rest of the world will do well to pay heed.
