US President Donald Trump has boundless self-confidence. He is undoubtedly intelligent and bold, and a master of risk-taking and deal-making. But he sometimes puts blinkers on when dealing with the rest of the world.
The problem with blinkers is that they lead to tunnel vision, obstructing the development of a broad or deep perspective, and reducing perception to a single direction. Mr Trump surrounds himself with family and a handful of billionaire loyalists, and often dismisses complexity, history and the fundamental principles of strategic policymaking.
This has been evident in his handling of several global files, including the future of Syria – a country trying to get back on its feet after the exit of Bashar Al Assad’s government last December. Syria is currently grappling with violent clashes in the southern province of Sweida, involving forces loyal to President Ahmad Al Shara’s government, the Druze and the Bedouins living in that part of the country.
The US President’s Syria file is now effectively managed by Tom Barrack, his ambassador to Turkey. A billionaire businessman, Mr Barrack is savvy and politically attuned, but views policy primarily through an investment lens just like Mr Trump and his other close advisers. There is less emphasis on historically grounded political frameworks. For them, financial power is the foundation of geostrategy.
Mr Trump’s fondness for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – a relationship that is key to Syria’s future – didn’t arise overnight. Over the years, Mr Trump has lavished Mr Erdogan with praise, backed him within Nato, and accommodated his concerns regarding the Kurdish movement both inside and outside Syria.
The US President agrees to Turkey’s influence in Syria.
Ankara’s role in ousting the Assad establishment, pushing Iran out of Syria, and undercutting Russia’s foothold there have all unfolded in full co-ordination with Washington. Indeed, Turkey alone might not have orchestrated these dramatic reversals in Syria without tacit US support. Today, Mr Al Shara’s hold over power is the product of US-Turkish investment with backing from key Arab powers.
These stakeholders see Mr Al Shara as a stabilising force who can prevent Syria from slipping into total chaos. They believe his background as leader of the now-defunct Hayat Tahrir Al Sham means he can negotiate with the fundamentalist forces he emerged from, and that he understands the language of appeasement needed to co-opt and contain them.
Mr Trump’s representatives in Syria and Turkey often sing in Ankara’s choir. They view Turkey as the senior supervisor and guarantor in Syria, sharing influence with Washington and some of its Arab partners.
For the US President’s circle, this soft American tutelage over Syria is enough, the task delegated to Turkish influence over critical Syrian institutions, provided that Turkey and Israel maintain an understanding, even if through superficial cordiality. Israel remains America’s foremost ally after all, and its share in any regional arrangements must therefore be always assured.
The Trump administration is aligned with Israel’s ambitions to establish a buffer zone inside Syria and to designate southern Syria a demilitarised zone. It supports Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights and is working on a framework for Israeli-Syrian security arrangements to replace the current UN Disengagement Observer Force. This would be a stepping stone to a transitional agreement and, eventually, a form of normalisation between the two neighbours.
The Israelis, however, don’t share the US’s assessment of Syria’s extremist factions. They don’t believe Mr Al Shara is willing or able to dismantle these factions, nor that he can completely break with his past associations with key extremist groups. In other words, Israel is far less enthusiastic than the Trump team is about positioning Mr Al Shara as Syria’s future.
While Israel is open to forging new security agreements and even exploring versions of the Abraham Accords with Syria, it isn’t prepared to invest in Mr Al Shara the way Washington and Ankara are. It doubts the Syrian President can meet American-Israeli demands because his core base would never allow it.
That may be a realistic reading. In truth, Mr Al Shara’s powers are either exaggerated – given that he lacks a viable army to enforce presidential authority independently – or he tacitly agrees with his base’s opposition to the American-Israeli agenda but seeks to avoid direct confrontation with Israel due to the latter’s military superiority.
The Trump administration is turning a blind eye to the recent clashes in Syria. The US President has put on his blinkers once again, unwilling even to consider that his policies might facilitate the resurgence of ISIS and other extremist groups. He is thus unconcerned about warnings of Syria’s possible fragmentation and partition if the violence gets out of hand. That’s why his administration has dismissed recent turmoil in Sweida as mere tribal skirmishes between the Druze and the Bedouins.
Indeed, what matters most to Mr Trump is the investment in Mr Al Shara, working in tandem with Ankara, and nudging Israel towards a scenario in which Damascus does little to obstruct Israel’s agenda. In exchange, the Syrian President would receive US support, perhaps including help to rebuild the military alongside securing international legitimacy and the promise of reintegration and reconstruction.
The Trump administration understands that Russia is now out of Syria, with no path for return. And it is determined not to allow Iran any opening to re-enter Syria either.
Yet Mr Trump and his advisers appear to believe that financial power solves all problems. They hence believe that co-opting figures aligned with Mr Al Shara – regardless of ideology – could help pacify them, based on the principle of resource-sharing to prevent territorial fragmentation.
As for the Druze, the Trump camp believes it could fare better under a model of limited self-governance yet without full secession. It envisages a scenario in which this key minority group benefits from the envisioned buffer zone to enjoy a degree of autonomy within Syria’s governing framework.
What matters most to the Trump team is the conviction that a stable Syria is the strongest bulwark against an ISIS resurgence, and that Mr Al Shara is the lock on that door.
