US President Donald Trump’s tour last week of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE was billed as diplomatic and economic engagement, complete with investment deals and high-profile meetings. But behind the pageantry, the visit offered a deeper message that the US is reasserting itself in the Gulf in favour of regional pragmatism. At the heart of this recalibration lies a strategic convergence between the US and its Gulf allies on two of the Middle East’s most entrenched challenges – Iran and Syria.
For years, Gulf capitals have expressed frustration with what they saw as Washington’s erratic presence in the region, characterised by rhetorical commitments without strategic consistency. Mr Trump’s visit sought to reverse that perception by reinforcing a vision that prioritises economic engagement and strategic containment over open-ended military entanglements or unfulfilled and costly democracy-promotion causes. Nowhere was this clearer than in the interlinked Iranian and Syrian files.
Mr Trump’s visit signalled the most tangible shift on Syria. In a move that would have been unthinkable a year ago, the US President met Syria’s new President, Ahmad Al Shara. The meeting capped months of lobbying by Gulf states, who have increasingly advocated for a post-Assad settlement rooted in Arab stewardship. Following the encounter, Mr Trump pledged to lift US sanctions on Damascus, clearing a path for broader international reintegration and investment that could revitalise the Syrian economy.
This US endorsement will certainly accelerate Gulf efforts that are already under way. Riyadh and Doha have announced a settlement of Syria’s World Bank arrears, the UAE has pledged full support for the country’s recovery and Doha reopened its embassy while offering to finance public-sector salaries. These moves reflect a shared calculus that re-establishing a functioning, centralised Syrian state, with Gulf support, is the most effective way to curb Iranian entrenchment in the Levant.
On Iran, Mr Trump’s position has been more ambiguous but no less significant. Upon returning to office, he swiftly reinstated the “maximum pressure” campaign, reimposing sanctions and curtailing Iran’s oil exports. The move is aimed at forcing Tehran into a new nuclear agreement. Critics argue that this strategy has only hardened Iran’s resolve, pushing it to enrich uranium at higher levels and deepening regional instability. Yet the administration has made clear that it views these measures not as a way of collapsing the Iranian government, but as pressure points to extract more favourable terms for a bigger, better agreement than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was abandoned in 2018.
At the same time, Mr Trump has reintroduced a diplomatic track with notable Gulf support. Indirect negotiations with Tehran began in March, following the delivery of a private letter to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by the UAE. Mediated by Oman, the talks have focused on limiting uranium enrichment and intend to address regional de-escalation, which is key to broader regional security. For Gulf states, the US dual-track approach mirrors their own assessment that pressure alone is insufficient, and that some form of negotiated settlement is necessary to prevent the kind of escalation that could destabilise the region.
Iran’s return to indirect negotiations is driven by both internal and external pressures. Domestically, a struggling economy affected by high inflation and unemployment, a climate crisis and rising public discontent have narrowed the government’s options. Fearful perhaps of another round of nationwide protests last seen in 2022-23 after the death of Mahsa Amini, Iran’s supreme leader has come to support engagement with the Trump administration to stave off domestic unrest. Interestingly, Iran’s leadership is appealing to Mr Trump’s deal-making impulses by appearing open to US commercial opportunities. Amid these challenges, the issue of post-Khamenei succession is also hanging over domestic decision-making. Externally, Mr Trump’s warnings of potential military action and growing international isolation have added urgency to Tehran’s calculations.
Gulf states, while not central players in the nuclear talks, have positioned themselves as constructive mediators looking to stave off any confrontation between Iran and the US that would likely also include Israel. Seeing themselves as eventual economic investors should an agreement be reached, this time Gulf states are playing an important guarantor role.
Still, the road to a new agreement is riddled with obstacles. Some members of Mr Trump’s administration have insisted on a full halt to uranium enrichment. This is a demand Tehran has repeatedly rejected as a violation of its sovereign rights. Meanwhile, the clock is ticking as European signatories to the original JCPOA threaten to reimpose sanctions if no deal is reached before the October “snapback” deadline. Both sides remain publicly entrenched, but diplomats say a principle-based framework that would lay the groundwork for a technical agreement is taking shape behind closed doors.
While in the Gulf, Mr Trump struck an optimistic tone. He told reporters that Iran had “sort of agreed” to terms limiting its nuclear activities, while reiterating that “all options remain on the table”. Gulf leaders welcomed the message, interpreting it as a blend of deterrence and diplomacy. What they fear most is unpredictability, and Mr Trump’s visit, despite his reputation for volatility that impacted Gulf states during his last administration, is seen as a step towards strategic coherence.
Equally important was the way Mr Trump framed the region itself. Throughout his trip, he praised the Gulf’s economic transformation – particularly Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s diversification efforts – as models of responsible governance. In contrast, he castigated Iran’s leadership as ideologically rigid and economically self-destructive. This rhetorical dichotomy was not incidental. It further reinforced a narrative that casts the Gulf as a pillar of regional stability and Iran as the source of disruption.
In this sense, the Gulf visit was not just about optics or defence deals. It was a strategic statement about how the US sees the future of Middle East security. Mr Trump’s endorsement of Gulf diplomatic initiatives, from Syria’s political transition to the Iran talks, signals an American burden-sharing approach in action.
This model will certainly be tested over the coming years and through future US electoral cycles. For now, much depends on the outcome of the Iran talks, the consolidation of Syria’s new government and by the enduring impact of the ongoing war in Gaza that – unlike other crises – appears to have no end in sight.
