Where do Turkey, Iran and Israel fit in Trump's reset of US-Arab relations?

The strategic breakthrough in US-Gulf relations, the billions of dollars in signed investments and economic partnerships, and the resounding success of US President Donald Trump’s visit to Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi mark a transformational shift in US-Arab relations. It has also sent a clear warning to both Iran and Israel: hesitation is costly and dangerous. Indeed, an exceptional vessel has set course with full sails towards a different future – with or without them. Political shrewdness now has an economic twin in wisdom. Vision has become the compass, and pragmatism has replaced slogans, one-upmanship and divisive disputes. So, where are the nations of the Gulf, and the broader Middle East and North Africa region, sailing to at this critical juncture? Let us begin with Turkey, whose President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has cultivated an excellent relationship with Mr Trump. This matters because the latter personalises policies and uses personal rapport as a benchmark for state-to-state relations. But that didn’t come out of nowhere. Turkey has acted as the key broker in achieving three major outcomes seen in Syria today. First, the swift collapse of Bashar Al Assad’s rule, and the meteoric rise of former Hayat Tahrir Al Sham leader Ahmad Al Shara to the presidency. This transition culminated this week in a meeting between Mr Al Shara and Mr Trump , who announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria at the request of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and in co-ordination with Mr Erdogan. Second, Turkey played a central role in forcing Russian influence out of Syria, capitalising on its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine. This has earned Turkey a new prestige in the EU and Nato. Third, Iran and its main proxy in Syria, Hezbollah, were pushed out in a manner that ended Tehran’s dominance, which had long propped up Mr Al Assad. It shut down Iranian arms supply routes to Hezbollah in Lebanon and smothered the life out of its “Persian Crescent” project. Mr Erdogan was present in Riyadh, albeit remotely, during the Trump-Al Shara meeting. Gulf political intelligence was evident in the realisation that Syria could return to the Arab fold only through co-ordinated integration with Turkey. For its part, Ankara welcomes the Gulf’s new roles in Syria, having understood that the country’s recovery requires economic investments and reconstruction efforts far beyond its means. Turkey also understands that its position in Syria also benefits its relationship with Israel. While this relationship appears tense, in practice it is one of co-ordination and tacit understanding. Mr Al Shara, meanwhile, has proved to be adaptable and pragmatic in forming partnerships . In exchange for the US lifting sanctions, he committed to eliminating extremist groups such as ISIS, and a willingness to join the Abraham Accords. He has reportedly also signalled readiness to accept a demilitarised zone in the Golan Heights, sidestepping the thorny issue of whether the territory is Syrian or Israeli. The challenges for Mr Al Shara are many. Is he willing or able to restrain groups he once belonged to? Can he protect minorities? Can he meet demands related to taking over prisons? Can he silence members of his own government who still speak the language of rejection when it comes to Israel? While Syria was the star of the Riyadh summit, Lebanon received less attention. Nonetheless, it was still mentioned by Mr Trump and Gulf leaders alike. Lebanon, after all, is key to a new Pax Americana being created in the region. Mr Trump is aiming to shape a regional security order that excludes no one. He has offered both Iran and Israel a road map, but he could not persuade either country to accept it before or during the visit. And having failed to secure a resolution on the Gaza conflict, it’s fair to say that this visit fell short politically even if it was a resounding success economically. In the process, Israel has lost out. Mr Trump’s visit made it clear that the US-Saudi strategic breakthrough could be achieved without Riyadh formally joining the Abraham Accords. That is a blow to Israel. This does not mean the US-Israel alliance is in jeopardy. But it does mean that the previous dynamic between the two countries has shifted, especially in light of the qualitative leap in America’s relations with the Gulf. Indeed, until recently, the Abraham Accords were a prerequisite for moving forward. Today, they are a goal, albeit no longer a condition for achieving a US-Saudi strategic breakthrough or a broader transformation in American-Arab relations. Mr Trump was keen to extend a hand to Iran even as he solidified ties with the Gulf, which has in turn played a positive role in attempting to narrow the gap between American and Iranian positions, aiming to avoid a military confrontation. Mr Trump was explicit in inviting Iran to join the peace wagon – laden with economic, political and investment incentives. He also made it clear that what’s expected of Tehran is not just nuclear restraint, but also a halt to using armed proxies in the region. Iran has dragged its feet and continues to stall , although Mr Trump’s announcement lifting sanctions on Syria will have given Tehran hope that it, too, can get sanctions relief if a deal is struck with Washington. However, the US President won’t leave the door of inducement open forever. Mr Trump wants to shape the strategic architecture of a new regional order, and he is unlikely to wait indefinitely.