Amid the ongoing US-Iran talks in Oman, Tehran faces an existential choice

We don’t yet have the full details of what was discussed between US special envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Oman on Saturday . Nonetheless, it is necessary to dive into the mindset of the leaders in Washington and Tehran over questions regarding the future of Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme and its support for armed proxies in the Middle East. The outlines of the negotiations indicate that Iran’s establishment is floundering as it attempts to buy time, save face and find ways to escape while moving forward. It is aware of US President Donald Trump’s seriousness, both in his warnings and in his readiness to deliver a painful military strike to its nuclear facilities, which represent one of the foundational pillars of its doctrine. With its other pillar – represented by a network of armed militias – having been amputated by Israel in recent months, it understands that both pillars are now unstable and crumbling. Yet it hopes that its continued aggressive rhetoric against Israel might deter the Trump administration from acting decisively. Iran’s leaders have been trying to promote, for domestic and regional consumption, this notion that the Trump administration is prepared to abandon its insistence that Tehran change its regional behaviour in exchange for concessions on its nuclear programme. But if they believe this to be true, they haven’t understood Mr Trump’s convictions on the issue. The American leader who dismantled the arrangements put in place by former president Barack Obama with Tehran – arrangements that deliberately excluded Iran’s regional behaviour and its support for militias and proxies from the nuclear agreement – was not Mr Trump. It was Joe Biden. Let’s recall that it was the Biden administration that enabled Israel to carry out its crushing operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and against Hamas in Gaza. Mr Trump has reaped the benefits of what Mr Biden implemented, which also unwittingly led to the fall of the Iran-aligned Assad government in Syria. But the Trump administration is building on these breakthroughs by attempting to block Tehran from exploiting Iraq’s resources to evade sanctions and contain the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in that country. It is also carrying out military operations in Yemen aimed at degrading the Tehran-backed Houthi rebels . So for anyone to claim or suggest that Mr Trump is prepared to adopt Mr Obama’s approach by agreeing to overlook Iran’s regional behaviour is to misunderstand how he and his team think. In other words, the point of no return for Iran’s establishment has arrived. If it understands the value of what Washington is offering – lifting US-led sanctions, normalising US-Iran relations and ending Tehran’s international isolation – then it must abandon the doctrine of militias. The time has come for these proxies to submit to the sovereignty of the states in which they operate, rather than continuing the model of creating a state-within-a-state loyal to Iran that undermines national sovereignty. This means Tehran must force the likes of Hezbollah and the Houthis to hand over their weapons to their respective states. Yet recent reports suggest this may not be the case. At least not yet. There have been contradictory leaks, some saying that Tehran is ready to abandon the Houthis and withdraw from Yemen, and others claiming it is doubling down on its support and positioning there. Likewise, Hezbollah has reportedly expressed its willingness to relinquish its weapons, yet there are reports that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is still present on the ground in Lebanon, with dozens of its operatives planning alongside Hezbollah to reuse the Port of Beirut for arms manufacturing. Meanwhile, what is being telegraphed in Iraq doesn’t suggest that Tehran is in any way ready to allow the PMF to hand over its weapons to Baghdad. All of this reflects either cunning and manoeuvring on the Iranian leadership’s part or confusion within its ranks. If it is the former, then the thinking in Tehran could be that engaging in nuclear talks will draw the Trump administration into a negotiation over what the latter views to be its top priority: the nuclear issue . This could buy Tehran the time it needs to avoid American or Israeli military strikes, to regroup its proxies, and to evade the consequences of having to relinquish both pillars of its doctrine. In any case, the talks in Oman involving Mr Witkoff and Mr Araghchi, in the presence of Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al Busaidi, ended with an agreement to continue discussions in the coming week. Ahead of the meeting, the Trump team had emphasised a strict timeline by categorically rejecting any open-ended timeframe and instead insisting on a one- or two-month period for Tehran to accept Washington’s set of demands. These demands include Iran opening its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency and accepting broader inspections in pursuit of dismantling its nuclear weapons programme. Iran has made it clear that it has rejected this demand, although it has opened the door for discussing the idea of a temporary, phased agreement on the nuclear issue. Another demand is that Iran cease shipping weapons, missiles and ammunition to its proxies in the region, as well as halt its use of proxies to destabilise the region. Washington also insists that talks not be limited to the nuclear file but also include Tehran’s ballistic missile programme. Finally, the package includes a demand that Tehran commit to Israel’s security. Iran will use the coming week to process and review these demands as well as its options. “I think we are very close to a basis for negotiations and if we can conclude this basis next week, we’ll have gone a long way and will be able to start real discussions based on that,” Mr Araghchi said after the meeting. In the end, Iran’s leadership must know that it can’t keep the door of dialogue open indefinitely, for the era of “strategic patience” has run its course. Ultimately, and sooner rather than later, it needs to decide whether to modify its doctrine in order to ensure regime survival – or cling to it, even if this might spell regime destruction.