US President Donald Trump has resisted any real fallout from the scandal involving senior officials in his administration engaging in secret discussions – inadvertently leaked to a journalist – over the messaging app Signal about planned strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. On the contrary, he is likely to double down on his resolve to sever the Houthi arm that serves Iranian interests – not merely to divert attention from the Signal scandal, but because intensifying pressure on Iran and thwarting its nuclear and expansionist ambitions forms the core of a broader strategic project for Mr Trump’s Middle East policy.
The strategic project also encompasses Washington’s stance on the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, which now stands as one of the few remaining cards in Tehran’s hands. Syria, Lebanon and their future relationship with Israel are also embedded in the strategy, as is the role of Turkey in Syria, along with the emerging Turkish-Syrian partnership aimed at containing Iran and blocking its advance. As for Gaza, the fate of the Palestinian enclave remains tethered to decisions made by Hamas, a paralysed Iranian proxy, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon. So, what should we expect next?
The Signal scandal was not only a serious security breach, but also a wake-up call for Europe, given the group chat’s leaked messages included senior US policymakers’ stated intentions to bill Europe for American operations against the Houthis. The rationale was that Europe relies on the maritime corridors disrupted by Houthi attacks far more than the US. For America’s European allies, the overall picture is a smug US administration with a superiority complex that is also both reckless and impulsive.
But none of this diminishes the fact that Mr Trump has come up with some serious and innovative foreign policies, however acrobatic their implementation may sometimes appear. Indeed, regardless of the divisions within the American public over Iran and how to deal with it, there is broad consensus on the danger of Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. A growing majority also now recognises the implications of Iran’s regional behaviour and its support for militias in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently announced that Tehran sent a reply via the Sultanate of Oman to a letter sent by Mr Trump earlier in March, in which he had urged Iran to swiftly agree to American terms for a new nuclear deal or else face a confrontation. The content of Iran’s reply has not yet been released, but some leaked information suggests Tehran has signalled a readiness to begin negotiations, though this may be an effort to buy time. It remains unclear whether the letter included any formal request from Washington for Iran to dissolve the PMF in Iraq, but the Iranian ambassador to Iraq, Mohammed Kazem Al-e Sadeq, has claimed this is the case.
Publicly, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei has dismissed American threats, especially given that the Trump administration continues to pursue a “maximum pressure” strategy, including its efforts to completely halt Iran’s oil exports. This unfolds amid the deployment of new American air and naval forces in the region, with a direct message to Tehran: comply with the demands or face swift consequences.
In other words, Mr Trump is deploying his familiar strategy of carrot and stick: using inducements and threats to push Tehran to accept American demands regarding its nuclear and missile programmes, and its regional proxies, in exchange for sparing it the US economic and military stick.
The Iranian leadership is acutely aware that Washington will not back down from achieving its military objectives against the Houthis in Yemen, and that Tehran is powerless to assist its Houthi proxy.
Mr Trump has also hinted that some within the Houthi ranks wish to back down, preferring defeat to total destruction. But perhaps this is wishful thinking. What is evident, though, is the president’s resolve to eliminate the Houthis in Yemen, which may have only increased after the Signal fiasco.
Mr Trump has a vision for Lebanon, too, regarding the fate of Hezbollah’s weapons, and the demarcation of both the Lebanese-Israeli and Lebanese-Syrian borders. The US position is clear: end Lebanese-Israeli disputes to enable formal demarcation of land borders, remove Israeli occupation through negotiation and reach a peace agreement that includes normalisation with Israel. This American offer is contingent upon Lebanon committing to disarm Hezbollah and to extend state authority and a monopoly on the use of force across all Lebanese territory.
Border demarcation should be a Lebanese demand before it is an American one. Ideological rigidity does not serve Lebanese national security, and posturing in the name of Palestinian solidarity cannot justify abandoning Lebanese interests. Lebanon’s interest lies in demarcating its borders with its neighbours and normalising relations following the removal of occupation.
Saudi Arabia’s hosting of talks between the Lebanese and Syrian defence ministers is a significant precedent. The two ministers agreed on border demarcation and security coordination to address military and security challenges through legal committees and reactivated mechanisms. Hezbollah had used border areas as corridors to smuggle weapons to and from Syria, and as a conduit for drug trafficking via dozens of illegal crossings.
America’s concern with Levantine borders is connected to its ambitions to open a new chapter between Israel and Arab states, especially given Saudi Arabia’s role in this chapter, contingent on Washington’s approval of a Palestinian state as a precondition. Despite Mr Trump’s missteps and colossal blunders, such as entertaining the notion of purchasing or owning Gaza, Washington continues its efforts with Arab partners to avert the looming catastrophe in Gaza.
Hamas has persisted in prioritising its own stature above the fate of Gaza’s people, who are increasingly rejecting the movement’s grip and the sacrifice of their children for its survival.
But Hamas has lost Iran, and Iran has lost its influence in Gaza. That proxy has fallen from Iran’s pocket. Syria has more or less expelled Iran from its soil. Hezbollah itself has become a severed limb of Iran. It can no longer pretend to resist Israel from southern Lebanon or claim its weapons are vital. It would do better to disarm voluntarily before it is too late, and to reclaim its Lebanese identity, for tying its fate to Iran’s is self-destructive.
As for the naive belief that the Signal scandal will cause Mr Trump to retreat on global policy matters, that is delusional. Watch what the American president will do next: he is a man who knows how to turn scandals into leverage for his coming battles.
