Israel’s coalition politics have long been marked by instability, ideological fragmentation and the challenges of managing a divided society with conflicting interests. But the political landscape has been further complicated by the rise in the past few years of the settler religious-Zionist faction, led by figures like former national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. Their entry into the Israeli Cabinet in 2022 was a turning point for Israel.
Mr Ben-Gvir resigned from his ministerial position earlier this month, while Mr Smotrich remains in government. Their newly divergent paths raise critical questions about the role of hardline ideologues within the Israeli political system.
What are the implications of their participation in government versus a return to street politics? That question matters because the trajectory of Jewish religious extremism in Israeli politics will impact the progress of the ongoing ceasefire in Gaza, broader regional stability and prospects for international peace and security.
The extreme right of Israeli politics consists of far-right nationalists, religious Zionists and settlers. Virtually all of them advocate for the annexation of the occupied West Bank, Jewish sovereignty over key religious sites and opposition to Palestinian statehood. Their rhetoric has fuelled tensions with Palestinians and undermined the possibility of a two-state solution.
Mr Ben-Gvir, leader of the Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party, and Mr Smotrich, head of the Religious Zionism party, were instrumental in securing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition, at the price of shifting Israel’s already conservative politics even further to the right. This has, in limited ways, made Israel’s politics more inclusive. But, for the most part, the effects have been deeply destabilising.
On one hand, their inclusion brought far-right factions under the umbrella of formal politics, allowing Mr Netanyahu to negotiate and supposedly temper their more extreme demands. On the other, their presence has legitimised their views, emboldened settler movements, inflamed tensions with Palestinians and strained Israel’s relations with key regional players – particularly Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, as well as Israel’s western allies, including the US.
Mr Ben-Gvir’s tenure as minister of national security saw expanded police powers. It also brought a rise in Jewish armed militias and provocative actions, such as far-right marches through Arab East Jerusalem. Mr Smotrich, as Finance Minister, has directed funding towards settlement expansion, further entrenching “civilianised” Israeli control over the occupied West Bank (as opposed to an exclusively military occupation). These policies were steps towards not only de facto but also de jure annexation. As a result, they also contributed to the erosion of previous ceasefire arrangements that had existed prior to Hamas’s surprise attack against Israel on October 7, 2023.
Mr Ben-Gvir’s resignation – ostensibly in protest of Israel agreeing a phased ceasefire with Hamas – could signal a tactical retreat, allowing him to re-engage in grassroots activism. Meanwhile, Mr Smotrich’s continued presence suggests that the settler religious-Zionist agenda remains central to the government’s policies, complicating further ceasefire negotiations and relations with Egypt and Jordan.
Recent proposals within Israel for Palestinian displacement – echoing ideas from Mr Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump – have been met with strong opposition from regional leaders. As Egypt’s Ambassador to the US bluntly wrote in The Hill, a Washington newspaper: “Egypt’s stance is clear: it cannot be part of any solution that involves the transfer of Palestinians into Sinai. Such a move would trigger a second Nakba, an unimaginable tragedy for a resilient people who have an unbreakable bond with their ancestral land.”
Jordan’s King Abdullah echoed that position regarding the thought of displacing Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan.
If Mr Ben-Gvir returns to street politics, the risk of increased settler violence and clashes with Palestinians will rise. Jewish far-right militants have used protests and provocations – especially around Al Aqsa Mosque – to stoke tensions. Any perceived threat to Al Aqsa’s status quo as a site under the auspices of the Jerusalem Waqf, a Muslim trust administered by the Jordanian government, could spark widespread unrest across the region.
Far-right protests and settler violence could also provoke Palestinian retaliation and threaten Gaza’s fragile ceasefire, leading to a cycle of escalation that the government may struggle to control. After all, Hamas refers to its October 7 attack as “Al Aqsa Flood” and has frequently cited Jewish extremists dangerously provoking tensions around the mosque in its statements.
Since 2020’s Abraham Accords, which established relations between Israel and several Arab states, Mr Netanyahu had convinced many observers and analysts that the Palestinian issue appeared to have been sidelined and that nothing would stir the broader Arab and Muslim populations anymore. He was proved wrong.
Despite political turmoil, public opinion in Israel largely supports the Gaza ceasefire. A recent survey found that 73 per cent of Israelis favour the agreement, including 91 per cent of opposition voters and 52 per cent of Mr Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition supporters. This suggests that Mr Netanyahu’s decision to endorse the ceasefire aligns with broader public sentiment, even at the cost of alienating his far-right partners.
But Mr Smotrich’s role in government has already strained the ceasefire by advancing policies that deepen Palestinian grievances, including increased settlement funding and construction restrictions for Palestinians. While Mr Ben-Gvir’s absence may reduce some pressures in the Cabinet, his potential return to activism could create new flashpoints.
The coalition's stability, moreover, is now more precarious following Otzma Yehudit’s exit, reducing Mr Netanyahu’s parliamentary majority. The ceasefire’s initial phase involves the release of hostages and Palestinian prisoners, a process that could further strain the government if additional right-wing parties decide to break away.
Should the government collapse, Israel may face new elections or a political realignment, creating further uncertainty but also further opportunity. A weakened Mr Netanyahu could open the door for opposition parties to push for leadership change, potentially altering Israel’s approach to the conflict.
The internal divisions over the ceasefire have exposed Mr Netanyahu’s vulnerability, and there is even speculation that Mr Trump may not support him indefinitely. Mr Trump, known for holding grudges, has probably not forgotten that Mr Netanyahu was too quick to congratulate Joe Biden on his 2020 election as President – in a vote Mr Trump still insists was illegitimate.
If Mr Trump perceives the Israeli leader as an obstacle to regional stability – especially after Mr Netanyahu’s mishandling of relations with key US partners like Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Turkey – he may be willing to see him ousted. The future of Mr Netanyahu’s leadership could depend not just on domestic politics but more importantly on regional dynamics and on how Washington perceives his ability to manage Israel’s security interests.
The future of the settler-right faction, meanwhile, remains uncertain, but its influence is undeniable. Whether inside or outside government, figures like Mr Ben-Gvir and Mr Smotrich will continue shaping Israel’s trajectory.
Mr Netanyahu faces a precarious balancing act. His coalition is fragile, public opinion is shifting, and external pressures – particularly from within the region and from Washington – are mounting. The question is whether he can maintain control or if his government will collapse under internal and external pressures.
Ultimately, as long as hardline ideologues dominate Israeli politics, stability – let alone a sustainable peace process – will remain elusive.
