Wealthy Muslim countries frequently try to help their developing counterparts through financial aid programmes. A complementary approach that may yield more lasting results is high-level visits that help raise the profile of the countries in need of assistance.
This is because such exposure can boost exports and other economic engagement with the rest of the Islamic world. Exploring this alternative is especially important given the patchy record that international development aid has in fostering economic growth.
High-level official visits serve a number of functions. One of the most important is that they act as a public indicator of how much the visiting country values its relationship with the one being visited, especially when the travelling head of state or government rarely ventures beyond their home country’s shores. For example, owing to his health difficulties, former US president Franklin Roosevelt seldom travelled abroad, reinforcing the pivotal nature of exceptions such as his participation at the Yalta Conference in 1945 as the Second World War was coming to an end.
This headline purpose is complemented by a more functional one, which is that the large delegations involved in high-level official visits take the opportunity to co-ordinate intensively with their counterparts, paving the way for effective co-operation. This mechanism was on show on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, when President Sheikh Mohamed headed a large, multisectoral delegation that explored a wide array of co-operative ventures with the US.
An alternative function that such visits can serve – one that could be used more often by Muslim nations – is elevating the profile of the country being visited. A recent paper by the European Central Bank economist Dr Alexander Popov demonstrated how effective this channel can be in the context of papal visits.
Dr Popov noted that during the 1978-2005 reign of Pope John Paul II, the Pontiff visited 129 countries, exceeding the cumulative total of all his 263 predecessors (partly a function of modern-day transport). Notably, after a papal visit, these countries experienced a substantive increase in their exports to countries with a high share of Catholics, in turn causing a non-negligible rise in total exports.
Critically, the biggest beneficiaries were countries that occupied the lower rungs in the development ladder, and that had weaker existing trade links. Dr Popov was able to surmise that the cause of this papal dividend was the elevation in global profile that his visits conferred upon these countries, accentuated by the growth in television broadcasts of the Pope’s travels.
Given how recently this research was done, we do not know if visits by other popes have a similar positive effect, nor do we have any idea if the travels of leading figures in the Muslim world – be they heads of state and government or religious leaders – also benefit the receiving country. The challenge before an enterprising scholar will be to extend Dr Popov’s work to verify its degree of generalisability.
While we await such efforts, political leaders in the Muslim world may wish to proactively use this technique as part of their broader efforts at assisting developing countries.
Muslim nations that have been blessed with larger riches regularly come to the aid of their less fortunate brethren, with the favoured technique being financial and in-kind development assistance. This inter-governmental support is bolstered by a large volume of civilian aid, often transmitted through religious organisations based in the donor countries.
While such aid may be welcomed by the recipients, studies of the impact of foreign aid in general – spanning that which occurs between Muslim countries and all other religious and secular forms – paint an equivocal picture about the effectiveness of the support rendered.
Projects such as the post-war Marshall Plan, where the US invested heavily in the growth of Western Europe, are positive exemplars, but history is littered with examples of foreign aid barely having an effect, or sometimes even causing damage. One of the most recent illustrations is the assistance that Haiti received after its 2010 earthquake, as it created dependency on foreign aid, weakened the local government, and disrupted domestic markets.
In contrast, organic growth in the demand for a developing country’s exports is virtually assured to be a sustainable source of rising living standards. Crucially – and in line with Islamic principles – helping a society to better stand on its own two feet is preferable to continuous financial donations, as it helps the recipients maintain their sense of self-worth and dignity. While there are many complex interventions that can help a country improve its exports, Dr Popov’s research suggests that an incredibly cost-effective one would be for high-profile leaders of friendly nations to visit that country, thereby shining a light on it.
In some sense, these findings are unsurprising, as we have seen this mechanism at play at the level of charity patrons for decades.
Celebrities regularly join the boards of non-profits and visit their premises explicitly because they know that such activities elevate the charity’s profile, helping it attract resources and pursue its mission. This should make political leaders in the Muslim world feel more confident in putting this technique to good use in friendly countries that would normally be recipients of international development aid.
The potentially most difficult barrier to overcome would be a change in the mindset relating to official visits, whereby they would become less about diplomatic signalling and more about elevating the profile of friends in need. Realising that such an evolution could contribute to a more integrated and mutually supportive Muslim world should make them enthusiastic.
