“I swear, on my honour, not to forsake you in the hard journey we have ahead of us. Do not forsake me,” Iran’s President-elect, Dr Masoud Pezeshkian, wrote in an appeal to the Iranian public on X, formerly known as Twitter, on Saturday morning.
Far from triumphant, Dr Pezeshkian’s message reflects his awareness of the formidable challenges he faces: a political system in which half of the electorate boycotted the election; an economy suffering under the international sanctions regime, mismanagement and corruption; and an international environment characterised by high tensions in relations with Israel and the US.
Throughout the campaign and in the televised presidential debates, Dr Pezeshkian pointed out some of the problems in Iran’s political system and economy, but his solutions were abstract. In the foreign policy debate, however, he was remarkably concrete. By comparing his statements with the policy preferences of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, we can predict Iran’s foreign policy under a new president and assess its implications for regional security over the next four years.
A negotiated solution to the crisis over Iran’s controversial nuclear weapons programme was at the centre of most televised presidential debates in the country. Here, Dr Pezeshkian defended former president Hassan Rouhani’s nuclear diplomacy that, in 2015, culminated in the landmark Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Dr Pezeshkian also openly accused his rivals, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, of sabotaging Mr Rouhani’s attempts at renegotiating the JCPOA with US President Joe Biden’s administration in 2021. According to Dr Pezeshkian, they did not oppose the JCPOA as a matter of principle but in order to deny Mr Rouhani a diplomatic victory, negotiate the deal themselves and take credit for an agreement with the US.
Dr Pezeshkian has a popular mandate to revive the nuclear negotiations with the US, but strategic decisions in Iran are made by the Supreme National Security Council, where the IRGC exercises significant influence, and whose decisions must be approved by Mr Khamenei.
The supreme leader, in turn, who was angered when former US president Donald Trump withdrew his country from the JCPOA in 2018, is not likely to authorise a new round of negotiations until the outcome of the presidential election in the US is known. A second Trump presidency, however, does not necessarily rule out a nuclear deal. As Dr Pezeshkian consistently said in the televised debates: “Trump is a businessman. We can do business with him.”
Such a potential deal, however, must necessarily also satisfy the economic interests of the IRGC, which will demand a price in return for postponing its nuclear ambitions.
In the course of the televised debates, Dr Pezeshkian also praised the improvement of Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbours, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE, under the late president Ebrahim Raisi. More controversially, Dr Pezeshkian consistently raised the issue of the mob attack on the Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran in 2016. As with the JCPOA, he accused opponents of Mr Rouhani of orchestrating the attacks so that the then president would lose face. The result, however, was Iran’s diplomatic isolation in the Arab world, Dr Pezeshkian said repeatedly.
The President-elect is clearly committed to continuing the path of detente with Arab neighbours, but as with the JCPOA, he cannot act independently of the IRGC-dominated Supreme National Security Council, and without final approval from Mr Khamenei.
Iran’s policies are also likely to be shaped by the nature of its relations with Israel and the US. Should the terrible war in Gaza spread to Lebanon, and should Iran come to the aid of its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, Washington may be entangled in a direct confrontation with Tehran. In the face of such a formidable adversary, might the IRGC take retaliatory action against the Arab neighbours?
In the past, the Iranian regime and its allies targeted international shipping and oil installations in retaliation against the erstwhile Trump administration’s expressed wish to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero. Despite Dr Pezeshkian’s positive signals, resuming such a policy is a distinct possibility in the case of an Iran-US military confrontation.
In sum, Dr Pezeshkian appears committed to reaching a negotiated solution to the nuclear crisis and engaging in constructive co-operation with the Arab states. He is also likely to bring capable diplomats back into government to enforce his policies.
However, Iran’s behaviour may change depending on the state of its relations with Israel and the US. Despite the President-elect’s best intentions, he may find himself entangled in the same foreign policy crises as his predecessors.
