Raghida Dergham is the founder and executive chairwoman of the Beirut Institute, and a columnist for The National
April 23, 2023
Many have wondered how, in the aftermath of the recent Chinese-brokered detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, to think about efforts by Arab states to reintegrate Syria into the region. How might Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s relations with Iran and Hezbollah affect any rehabilitation? Are we seeing today the components of a roadmap being drawn that would mean a substantive — not just ceremonial — Syrian return to the fold?
Saudi Arabia will host the next Arab League Summit, taking place next month, and is thought to be drafting a pragmatic agenda that complements the new vision and approach of the Saudi leadership. It is an approach that does not rely on improvisation — far from it. Riyadh’s messaging is coherent, even if brief.
Mr Al Assad gradually needs to escape the Iranian grip, because he will not be able to be fully in control of any Syria that lies in the shadow of Iran’s continued dominance. Therefore, he may find that a relinkage with the Arab states — gradually, and as part of a regional deal — will be his salvation from total reliance on Iran and Russia.
Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (left) during a meeting with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, and Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi (right), in Tehran, on May 08, 2022. AFP
Arab states’ offer to Mr Al Assad is thought to include a pledge to help rebuild Syria, to ease its isolation and to create a bridge between it and the outside world. It also includes collective efforts to gradually contain Turkey’s influence, as well as Iran’s. In the view of many countries in the region, greater Arab influence in Syria could be reassuring to Syrians, and it would be in Mr Al Assad’s interest to be part of that effort to reassure instead of antagonising his people. But such an outcome would likely only be achieved in return for binding commitments from Mr Al Assad. These are the elements of a serious deal, not a mere reunion.
Iranian dominance in Syria is a strategic goal for Tehran, and the IRGC commanders will not favour being part of any reduction of their country’s footprint there
In terms of his relations with Hezbollah — which fought alongside Damascus against the Syrian opposition and has become his partner along with Iran — Mr Al Assad would likely be required to gradually disengage.
It is possible, particularly in the aftermath of the Iran-Saudi detente, that Iran would allow some political change in Syria, and that Russia would not mind it. Indeed, Moscow today sees Syria as a burden, and it needs to focus its energy on the war in Ukraine.
But why would Iran agree to such a radical shift? For one thing, it needs to overcome its economic dire straits, as well as its nuclear crisis, which makes it vulnerable to military confrontations, and its political isolation. Therefore, Iran may agree to concessions in the framework of a deal to normalise relations with other Arab states and secure the economic relief this entails, as well as the possibility of US sanctions relief if it abides by its commitments and radically softens its behaviour.
Moreover, the Biden administration is understood to be in favour of Arab states replacing the Astana process led by Russia, Turkey and Iran, by sponsoring a political process in Syria and working to persuade Mr Al Assad to make concessions to the opposition.
It would also be a welcome development for the Biden administration if the efforts of Arab countries that have normalised relations with Israel succeed in creating a climate that could gradually bring Syria into a comprehensive process of de-escalation in its outstanding conflicts with Israel. Today, the broad strategy of Gulf states, in particular, is to reduce, avoid and resolve conflicts throughout the Middle East, through a gradual approach and a qualitatively different kind of diplomatic engagement.
The aspirations of Saudi diplomacy were explained by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman during the Future Investment Initiative meeting in Riyadh in 2019, when he spoke about the dream he intended to turn into reality by transforming the Middle East into another Europe, becoming far removed from ideological conflicts and extremist policies. Then in the Jeddah Security and Development Summit last year, attended by leaders from the GCC, the US, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, the Crown Prince affirmed a vision that prioritises security, stability and prosperity, calling on Iran to work with the countries of the region and become part of that vision. Saudi Arabia’s hosting of the Arab League Summit in May will be another important milestone in the context of the pragmatic implementation of this vision, especially in the wake of the agreement with Iran. And Syria could be a testing ground.
If, as many expect, Mr Al Assad is truly ready to replace his reliance on Russia, Iran and Hezbollah with domestic reforms, dialogue with the opposition and accepting the return of Syrian refugees, then regional diplomacy will have delivered a coup. The key, however, is honest and true implementation.
This will not be easy for Mr Al Assad, even if he is persuaded, to get permission from Tehran, which has been a strategic partner for Damascus for decades, to become more independent. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may not be ready to end its pact with the regime in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This is where the problem lies: Iranian dominance in Syria is a strategic goal for Tehran, and the IRGC commanders will not favour being part of any reduction of their country’s footprint there.
Whatever happens, it is likely to happen only gradually, say those familiar with the process. Just as well — let caution be the compass to trust, and let trust be the destination.
Sheikh Dhiyab bin Isa (ruled 1761-1793) Built Qasr Al Hosn as a watchtower to guard over the only freshwater well on Abu Dhabi island.
Sheikh Shakhbut bin Dhiyab (ruled 1793-1816) Expanded the tower into a small fort and transferred his ruling place of residence from Liwa Oasis to the fort on the island.
Sheikh Tahnoon bin Shakhbut (ruled 1818-1833) Expanded Qasr Al Hosn further as Abu Dhabi grew from a small village of palm huts to a town of more than 5,000 inhabitants.
Sheikh Khalifa bin Shakhbut (ruled 1833-1845) Repaired and fortified the fort.
Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon (ruled 1845-1855) Turned Qasr Al Hosn into a strong two-storied structure.
Sheikh Zayed bin Khalifa (ruled 1855-1909) Expanded Qasr Al Hosn further to reflect the emirate's increasing prominence.
Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan (ruled 1928-1966) Renovated and enlarged Qasr Al Hosn, adding a decorative arch and two new villas.
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan (ruled 1966-2004) Moved the royal residence to Al Manhal palace and kept his diwan at Qasr Al Hosn.
Fewer criminals put behind bars and more to serve sentences in the community, with short sentences scrapped and many inmates released earlier.
Greater use of curfews and exclusion zones to deliver tougher supervision than ever on criminals.
Explore wider powers for judges to punish offenders by blocking them from attending football matches, banning them from driving or travelling abroad through an expansion of ‘ancillary orders’.
More Intensive Supervision Courts to tackle the root causes of crime such as alcohol and drug abuse – forcing repeat offenders to take part in tough treatment programmes or face prison.
The internal combustion engine is facing a watershed moment – major manufacturer Volvo is to stop producing petroleum-powered vehicles by 2021 and countries in Europe, including the UK, have vowed to ban their sale before 2040. The National takes a look at the story of one of the most successful technologies of the last 100 years and how it has impacted life in the UAE.
The internal combustion engine is facing a watershed moment – major manufacturer Volvo is to stop producing petroleum-powered vehicles by 2021 and countries in Europe, including the UK, have vowed to ban their sale before 2040. The National takes a look at the story of one of the most successful technologies of the last 100 years and how it has impacted life in the UAE.
11 cabbie-recommended restaurants and dishes to try in Abu Dhabi
Iqbal Restaurant behind Wendy’s on Hamdan Street for the chicken karahi (Dh14)
Pathemari in Navy Gate for prawn biryani (from Dh12 to Dh35)
Abu Al Nasar near Abu Dhabi Mall, for biryani (from Dh12 to Dh20)
Bonna Annee at Navy Gate for Ethiopian food (the Bonna Annee special costs Dh42 and comes with a mix of six house stews – key wet, minchet abesh, kekel, meser be sega, tibs fir fir and shiro).
Al Habasha in Tanker Mai for Ethiopian food (tibs, a hearty stew with meat, is a popular dish; here it costs Dh36.75 for lamb and beef versions)
Himalayan Restaurant in Mussaffa for Nepalese (the momos and chowmein noodles are best-selling items, and go for between Dh14 and Dh20)
Makalu in Mussaffa for Nepalese (get the chicken curry or chicken fry for Dh11)
Al Shaheen Cafeteria near Guardian Towers for a quick morning bite, especially the egg sandwich in paratha (Dh3.50)
Pinky Food Restaurant in Tanker Mai for tilapia
Tasty Zone for Nepalese-style noodles (Dh15)
Ibrahimi for Pakistani food (a quarter chicken tikka with roti costs Dh16)
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Emergency phone numbers in the UAE
Estijaba – 8001717 – number to call to request coronavirus testing
Ministry of Health and Prevention – 80011111
Dubai Health Authority – 800342 – The number to book a free video or voice consultation with a doctor or connect to a local health centre
Emirates airline – 600555555
Etihad Airways – 600555666
Ambulance – 998
Knowledge and Human Development Authority – 8005432 ext. 4 for Covid-19 queries
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