The anniversary of the nuclear agreement that was sealed between the P5+1 and Iran is approaching, and there are several questions to think about: how do we assess the economic and regional dimensions of the nuclear deal? Have hopes been fulfilled? And what have been the nuclear, diplomatic and military consequences and implications of this global agreement?
The Obama administration and the Rouhani government – specifically its technocrat nuclear team spearheaded by the foreign minister Javad Zarif – were two key players in getting this agreement signed.
Mr Obama believed that engaging with the Iranian leadership on the nuclear deal would persuade Tehran to moderate its behaviour towards the international community. Mr Obama pointed out in an interview with NPR that as a result of the nuclear agreement “Iran starts making different decisions that are less offensive to its neighbours; that it tones down the rhetoric in terms of its virulent opposition to Israel. And, you know, that’s something that we should welcome.”
As the nuclear terms started being implemented, the Obama administration began transferring billions of dollars to Iran’s central bank.
Iran has since increased its military budget by $1.5 billion (Dh5.51bn) from $15.6 billion to $17.1 billion.
Mohammadreza Pour Ebrahimi, a member of the parliament’s Economic Affairs Committee, pointed out: “In addition to the approved figures, $1.5 billion has been allocated to prop up defence of the country and this amount has been approved by this committee.”
Based on developments after the nuclear agreement was reached, Iran did not reduce its meddling in the affairs of other regional states. In fact, Iran’s military involvement in Iraq has been steadily increasing. Tehran has also become more forceful in its military and economic support for Bashar Al Assad in Syria.
Almost all signs indicate that the continuation of sanctions relief, as a consequence of the nuclear accord, is also helping Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and Al Quds Force to buttress Iran’s proxies including Hizbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite militias.
In addition, while the expectations were that the nuclear accord would reduce Iran’s ballistic missiles programmes, this has not proved the case.
Last October and November, Iran tested a new missile capable of carrying multiple warheads. In March, Iran again test-fired two ballistic missiles.
More recently, the Iranian government fired a test missile with an accuracy of less than eight metres, which is characterised as zero error, according to Brig Gen Ali Abdollahi, the Iranian military’s deputy chief of staff.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Agreement of the nuclear agreement between P5+1 and Iran is clear about this issue.
It states that Iran should not undertake ballistic missile activity “until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the broader conclusion, whichever is earlier”.
A United Nations Security Council resolution is also unequivocal about the same issue. The resolution “calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology”.
In addition, a further resolution indicates “Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that states shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities”.
Unfortunately, neither the United States nor other members of the P5+1 sent a robust signal to Iran’s IRGC that these activities would further endanger the stability of the Middle East and potentially run the risk of scuttling the nuclear agreement.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the major decision maker in Iran, has not shown any sign of moderating his provocative statements and stance towards the region or even towards the US.
One of the most important loopholes of the nuclear agreement is that it does not provide clear-cut executive and legal power to curb, punish or discipline Iran it violates the deal or engages in provocative military actions.
Iran is also cognisant of the fact that the issue of sanctions being snapped back into place is out of the question because of Russia and China’s veto power.
Nearly a year after the nuclear agreement, Iran has not contributed to making the region safer, more secure or stable.
As long as Mr Obama is in office, as long as the US does not show robust opposition when Iran breaks international laws, Tehran’s provocations will go unmarked, which will only serve to heighten tensions in the region.
Dr Majid Rafizadeh is an Iranian-American Harvard scholar and president of the International American Council on the Middle East
On Twitter: @dr_rafizadeh