It’s been a tough month for US President Donald Trump, who wants to continue believing that no one matches his stature. In his view, God spared his life after an assassination attempt so that he could “Make America Great Again”.
His foreign policy achievements during his historic visit to the Gulf Arab states are undeniable but his failures on Ukraine and Iran now weigh heavily on him before the G7 Summit (June 15–17) and Nato Summit (June 24–25).
Mr Trump abhors weakness – especially the appearance of it in front of friends-adversaries. He and his team appear to be making mistakes yet pretending all is well. They're claiming things are even improving, which only compounds the crisis.
The US–Iran talks have become a barometer for the Trump administration’s disarray and internal divisions. More troubling, however, is the failure to grasp – or the deliberate dismissal of – the consequences of the President’s positions and those of his de facto personal foreign minister, envoy Steve Witkoff, who now wields extraordinary powers. From the thorny Ukraine file to developments in tiny Lebanon – caught in the crosshairs of Iran and Israel – US policy appears scattered.
Mr Trump’s first official meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz passed smoothly, both men eager to move past prior disputes, though no unified policies emerged on the conflict on Europe’s eastern doorstep.
They discussed defence, trade, Nord Stream 2, relations with China, US tariff threats to Europe, migration, and, of course, Russia and Ukraine. They tackled Nato defence spending and how best to handle tariffs. Yet, it is the Ukraine crisis that will primarily shape the future of Mr Trump’s relations with Nato allies and the G7.
It’s not enough for Europeans – especially Germany, now positioning itself to lead Europe again – that the US President expresses sympathy with phrases like “the situation in Ukraine is very sad”. That is sentiment, not policy.
Mr Merz wanted details about the 75-minute call between Mr Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin that occurred the day before the Trump–Merz meeting. We know Mr Putin vowed retaliation for a recent Ukrainian strike that destroyed a third of Russia’s strategic bombers, but what comes next and where does the Trump administration really stand?
In essence, Mr Merz appeared to have put to have put pressure on Mr Trump during their White House meeting. Mr Trump didn’t treat him like he has others – particularly Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whom Mr Trump had publicly scolded and mocked in a brazen breach of diplomatic decorum.
Mr Merz’s professionalism eclipsed Mr Trump’s theatrics, including blaming the invasion of Ukraine on his predecessor, Joe Biden. The US President called Mr Merz “a tough guy, but a good one,” amid broad smiles between two men fully aware of the depth of the transatlantic rift and the urgent need to halt its deterioration.
Indeed, Mr Merz is no pushover. Germany’s bid to reclaim leadership in Europe is not something that can be mocked by Mr Trump and his team, especially as they attempt to reweave transatlantic ties not just with Russia in mind, but increasingly with China.
Notably, there was no indication that Mr Trump and Mr Merz discussed Iran, even though Germany is a member of the P5+1 group of countries that brokered the Iran nuclear deal under former US President Barack Obama.
The G7 Summit – comprising the US, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada, Japan, and the EU – will take place mid-June in Alberta, Canada. Dominating the agenda will be the Ukraine war, relations with Russia, and the various European strategies for engaging with China amid an ongoing tariff war.
As of now, Mr Trump has little to show for at the summit to claim success or fulfil his promise to end the war in Ukraine. His team is trying to strike Ukraine from the G7 agenda, but to no avail. European leaders are headed to Alberta buoyed by renewed self-confidence.
They will arrive in Alberta armed with political options in response to Mr Trump’s tariff threats, including talks with China over a potential free trade agreement. Should such a deal materialise, it would be a blow to Mr Trump. But the fear remains that Mr Trump’s reactions could become deliberately erratic and unpredictable.
European leaders are factoring this into their calculations. No one wants a rupture in transatlantic relations. After all, Europe recognises the need to preserve its strategic relationship with the US, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. America is still the anchor, and Europe knows it is the junior partner.
Europe’s growing strength is, in part, the result of Mr Trump’s own weak leverage. That will become even more evident at the Nato Summit in The Hague. Mr Trump may succeed in extracting more defence spending from Nato allies. But his grandstanding and bigger threats could backfire – and cost him dearly if acted upon.
Europe will fiercely resist any American tampering with Nato’s core guarantees, especially Article 5, which obligates mutual defence among the member states if any one of them is attacked. But if Mr Trump follows through on his threat to withdraw 20,000 US troops from Nato, he will weaken not just himself, but the US.
Between now and the Nato Summit, the Ukraine war continues to escalate. Mr Trump will arrive at both the G7 and Nato summits empty-handed and deflated. As for Iran, the picture is no brighter.
But before diving into the Iran issue, we must pause at Mr Trump’s very public clash with billionaire Elon Musk. This isn’t just a personal feud; it signals a fundamental rift on economic policy. Even if Mr Musk triggered the spat, the result reinforces Mr Trump's reputation for using people and discarding them. It leaves those around him on edge, afraid to be next.
Back to Iran — and how it is tying the US President’s hands ahead of both summits. This is not just due to internal rifts within Mr Trump’s team over the terms and outlook of negotiations with Iran, but also because Mr Trump faces a major credibility crisis. The fear of his deadlines has eroded, replaced by confidence that Mr Trump will back down.
The continuation of negotiations with Iran is essential for Mr Trump. Indeed, he and his team believe a military confrontation with Iran, triggered by a missed deadline, is a gamble that could endanger his political future. Hence, it is unlikely that Mr Trump will enforce his ultimatums or issue new ones with the seriousness of a real deadline. Instead, he is likely to allow Iran to buy time despite having denounced its stalling as intolerable and costly.
Mr Trump’s political prestige has somewhat faded, and he may no longer inspire the same fear, including in Iran’s decision-makers. This shift has had profound consequences, both inside Iran and among its regional proxies – chiefly Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The political assertiveness displayed by Tehran’s leadership and Hezbollah is rooted in the assessment that Mr Trump will neither strike Iran nor allow Israel to strike its nuclear facilities. Rather, he will concede to Iran’s red lines of no discussion of ballistic missiles and no compromise on its proxy doctrine – currently on display in Iran’s foreign policy on Syria and Lebanon.
The Trump administration’s missteps are consequential. Tehran’s rhetoric now focuses less on destroying the “Zionist entity” and more on protesting Israel’s racial policies. Iranian officials even admit that the ongoing negotiations are, behind the scenes, also with Israel – not just America.
The entire Middle East hopes for the negotiations to succeed, but not if success means the continued use by both Iran and Israel of some Arab countries – especially Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq – as proxy battlefields to avoid a direct war. Indeed, neither Israel has any good faith towards Lebanon nor is Iran willing to use Hezbollah for its aims. Both powers trample on Lebanese sovereignty in tacit co-ordination not far from Mr Trump’s earshot.
While Mr Trump is buying and selling time to Iran to protect his political standing, his envoy-turned-substitute-foreign-minister Steve Witkoff has pulled Morgan Ortagus from her role overseeing implementation of the Lebanon–Israel ceasefire deal – one Mr Trump himself had helped the Biden team achieve. Whether Ms Ortagus stays or goes is less important than the fact that no replacement has been named, which raises concerns about the Trump team’s short-sightedness – or worse, a more dangerous hidden agenda.
Lebanon’s three executive leaders – President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri – must stop stalling on disarming Hezbollah. One day they hide behind the facade of “dialogue,” which only emboldens Hezbollah. Another, they cite fear of blatant Hezbollah threats. Yet another, they say Washington has failed to pressure Israel to honour its own commitments under the ceasefire, without which Lebanon cannot proceed with disarmament.
Something smells fishy and Mr Trump’s entourage of billionaires and cronies remains oblivious to the dangers of Iran’s negotiation tactics and Israel’s duplicity, which is fuelling more violence and rash decisions from its leaders.
Everyone is holding everyone at gunpoint: Iran with the US President, preparing to retaliate for any Israeli strike by emulating Ukraine’s model of launching hundreds of drones in one wave. Even if 90 per cent are intercepted, that appears to be acceptable – as long as some hit Israel and Mr Trump takes the blame.
Israel's government, too, is holding the US President at gunpoint, preparing to take on Iran’s nuclear threat alone – making Mr Trump look weak and indecisive. Together, Iran and Israel are holding Lebanon at gunpoint using it as their battlefield of choice to destroy each other but unable to finish the job – while the Lebanese people pay the price.
The upcoming G7 and Nato summits have Mr Trump over a barrel – not just due to the European awakening from political slumber, but because his erratic style has left him exposed. His threats no longer carry the same weight. “No one knows what Donald Trump will do,” his supporters say with admiration. But surprise isn’t a strategy. And unpredictability is not a hallmark of political wisdom.
