The conditions are right for a Turkish-Kurdish peace, and it would transform the Middle East

A new initiative by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), to end a five-decade-long conflict has the potential to reshape the dynamics of the Middle East.

Mr Erdogan appears to have a set of goals he wants to achieve: disarm the PKK, demilitarise Turkey’s relationships with its southern neighbours, boost economic recovery and improve relations with the US and Europe, all in good time before the country’s next presidential election, due in 2028. While the Turkish leader has positioned himself to emerge victorious in this pursuit, Iraq, Syria and other Arab countries all have a stake in ensuring an amicable and sustainable resolution.

Turkey is home to almost half of the 40 million Kurds worldwide, as well as millions of other non-Turks, including Arabs. Yet critics tend to blame what they see as inadequate representation of non-Turks for some of the prevalent grievances and internal conflicts.

Since the collapse of the previous peace process with the PKK, in 2015, Ankara has been using military force to weaken the group. It is only in recent months that officials in Ankara began to re-engage with Kurdish leaders with an aim to kickstart negotiations with the group. They began indirect talks with Ocalan once they felt confident in their ability to dictate the terms of the process.

Ocalan is expected to deliver a message this month, following which war-weary PKK leaders will almost certainly transition into Turkish politics by joining legitimate political parties, perhaps including the pro-Kurdish DEM Party. Turkey is then likely to push for a legislative amnesty for Ocalan and the PKK, followed by a gradual relaxation of controls over the country’s Kurdish-majority cities.

The stakes for Iraq and its Kurdish population are high, as they stand to gain a lot from the Ankara-led peace process.

Turkey’s armed forces as well as the PKK have established strong military bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, having turned its beautiful mountains into combat zones. Over the decades, Ankara has conducted numerous incursions and strikes on PKK targets in northern Iraq and, in the process, militarised relations with both Baghdad and Erbil, while maintaining significant economic interests in the country’s energy, trade and infrastructure development.

Leaders in Iraqi Kurdistan will, therefore, be keenly following the recent developments. Some are even reportedly involved in multilateral, cross-border discussions. They know that ending the conflict between Turkey and the PKK would mean a more stable region for the Kurds and a much healthier relationship between Ankara and Baghdad.

Meanwhile, Kurds living in north-eastern Syria, known among Kurds as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava), have been among those most affected by Ankara’s conflict with the PKK – which probably means they stand to gain the most from the peace process.

Ocalan is likely to call upon PKK fighters in Syria to withdraw from the country and leave Syrian Kurdish leaders to negotiate their future with their fellow compatriots in Damascus – away from any external influence or Turkish threats of invasion. Ankara is then expected to reciprocate, by restraining its proxies and refraining from mounting direct attacks on north-eastern Syria.

The Kurdish and non-Kurdish populations of Syria’s north and east have long suffered isolation and neglect.

Over the past decade, they earned international recognition for their fight against ISIS. Despite this, residents have historically struggled to get full Syrian citizenship or guarantees for their human, political and cultural rights. They are wary of once again being reduced to second-class citizens in Syria. Kurdish leaders are aware that neither Ankara nor Damascus would accept a federal or any other form of asymmetrical autonomy for the area, therefore they aim at forging a reasonable symmetrical administrative decentralisation for all regions of Syria.

Fortunately, Syria’s new leaders have so far approached the Kurdish issue with a moderate tone, although they have yet to provide clarity on how they will institutionalise Kurdish rights within a unified Syria. Nonetheless, they realise that the country cannot be reunited by establishing a new version of the previously centralised governing system.

Agreeing on a credible model of regional administrative autonomy across all governorates will be essential to building trust, fostering reconciliation and maintaining national unity.

Arab countries are largely sympathetic to the Kurdish cause, with some viewing Turkey’s growing influence in the region with caution. They opposed Iran’s hegemony in Syria, and they do not wish to see the country becoming too reliant on Turkey.

It is paramount for Arab countries to show an interest in Mr Erdogan’s peace process and press Turkish leaders to de-securitise relations with their southern neighbours, particularly Syria. By advocating Kurdish rights within a unified Syria, they should help both Damascus and Kurdish leaders of "Rojava" engage constructively and negotiate their collective future between them. This will further expedite Syria’s objective of regaining its sovereignty and contributing to the region’s stability.

An inclusive peace process with the Kurds would increase Turkey’s standing in the West, too.

The US and the European countries all have stakes in the Middle East’s stability. They have, over the years, committed huge political, financial and military capital to the region. A lasting peace between Turks and Kurds can unwind the intricate security dynamics between the region’s web of state and non-state actors, while reducing cross-border conflicts, violent extremism, population displacement – including that of refugees – and barriers for economic partnership.

This is what the West is looking for. In return, it can make a difference by using its multiple leverages to promote deeper and more institutionalised dialogue among the region’s stakeholders. Fortunately, the new US administration under President Donald Trump has been advocating peace and economic partnership in the region, and it is likely to welcome the peace process, which might ultimately even pave the way for a reduced American military presence in Syria.

The Turkish-Kurdish peace process constitutes a unique opportunity for Turkey’s leaders to adopt overarching policies to address the bigger and wider Kurdish issue, both inside and outside Turkey. Conversely, Kurdish leaders across the region have a chance to embrace this initiative and turn it into a roadmap for a lasting peace. They should be open to inviting other regional and international actors to play constructive roles and invest in the broader regional peace and prosperity.