Exporters increasingly find 'alternative markets' ahead of Aug 1 tariff deadline

With US tariffs climbing – particularly on politically sensitive goods like steel, electric vehicles and pharmaceuticals – some firms have begun rerouting exports to more predictable, lower-tariff markets, though not yet at scale. The question now is how widespread it will become, and at what economic cost. 

India offers an early example. The Asian subcontinent is facing tariffs of up to 26 per cent – among the steepest imposed on any major economy – on goods coming into the US under President Donald Trump’s Liberation Day levies. India’s $32 billion jewellery and gems industry is looking to alternative markets, especially the Middle East.

That shift will be on show at Sajex 2025, a jewellery trade fair set for September in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Backed by the Indian government and industry bodies, the event is part of a broader push to establish the Middle East as a long-term market for Indian exports.

India, a global leader in diamond processing and jewellery manufacturing, regards Saudi Arabia as a big growth opportunity, especially as trade tensions with the US resurface. The kingdom’s jewellery market was estimated at $4.6 billion in 2024 and is expected to grow strongly through 2030.

Tariff push

For many countries, US tariff increases under the current administration have remained modest so far, typically around 10 per cent, whereas two dozen or so face substantially higher levies. So, the impact of tariffs is concentrated but weighty.

For now, many exporters are coping with this by stomaching a squeeze in their margins, negotiating lower prices with suppliers, or taking advantage of weaker domestic currencies, which help to offset some of the added cost. But if tariffs rise permanently to above 10 per cent to15 per cent, it will lead to economics shifting in many industries.

At that point, rethinking where and how to export becomes unavoidable.

China, which had faced tariffs as high as 145 per cent on some goods entering the US, responded by accelerating shipments ahead of tariff deadlines and redirecting exports to other markets. That redirection has been greatest to those economies with a free trade agreement with China, or where import penetration was below average.

The Trump administration announced new levies in April but delayed implementation twice – first to July, then again to August – prompting a rush to beat the clock. Some of those duties have since been eased under a temporary trade truce agreed between Washington and Beijing in London. Another meeting is taking place in Stockholm on Monday.

Still, Chinese exports to the US fell 10.9 per cent year-on-year in dollar terms during the first half of the year. Over the same period, exports to Asean countries – some of which Washington claims are being used to reroute Chinese goods and bypass tariffs – rose 13 per cent. In June alone, total Chinese exports rose 5.8 per cent in dollar terms, driven in part by firms racing to move goods before tariffs take effect in August.

The surge offered a short-term lift to China’s economy, which has leaned heavily on exports to compensate for weak domestic demand amid a prolonged property sector downturn.

China-EU shift?

While concerns persist over a wave of redirected Chinese goods entering Europe and other industrialised markets, there is little clear evidence of such a shift – at least not yet. Much of the excess appears to be heading into emerging economies, where trade oversight tends to be lighter and price remains a bigger factor in purchasing decisions.

In China’s case, the worry extends beyond volume. Some believe that redirected exports are state-subsidised, fuelling fears in places like the EU that competition is being distorted long before goods cross any borders.

Meanwhile, on Sunday, a new trade deal was reached between the US and the EU with a 15 per tariff on most EU goods to the US, including pharmaceuticals, automobiles and semiconductors, averting a transatlantic trade war. Tariffs on metals remain unchanged.

For now, changes in global trade flows are limited. One reason is that for heavily regulated or very complex products, like medical devices or automotive parts, redirecting exports tends to require compliance with new safety and certification standards. That can be time consuming and costly. 

Also, shifting factories across borders does not happen overnight. The semiconductor industry offers a good example. Two years ago, Taiwan’s TSMC, one of the world's largest chip makers, said it planned to build a new €10 billion semiconductor plant in Germany. However, the factory is not expected to be up and running until 2027.

For exporters, such delays can affect revenue. For importers, higher tariffs usually lead to higher consumer prices. In the US, this is already happening, with inflation rising to 2.7 per cent in June, ahead of forecasts, and core inflation increasing to 2.9 per cent.

US retail stalwart Walmart, which imports heavily from China and Mexico, has warned that even a partial rollback of US tariffs leaves them too high to absorb. The last US-China trade war, launched in 2018, saw nearly all tariff costs passed through to American firms and consumers. History seems to be repeating itself.

Macroeconomic data points to the broader fallout. A surge in imports, driven by pre-tariff stockpiling, helped drag the US economy into a 0.2 per cent annualised contraction in the first quarter of the year, the first such decline since 2022.

General Motors is a case study in tariff exposure. With plants in Mexico, South Korea and Canada, the US car maker absorbed $1.1 billion in tariff costs in the second quarter, wiping out nearly a third of its adjusted profits.

For now, many executives I teach at IMD are still in wait-and-see mode. Some companies are now delaying production shifts until 2026. Many cite advice to front-load exports before each tariff deadline. That has tactic worked so far. But with another deadline looming on August 1, the space for temporary fixes is closing.

The deeper lesson of this moment is that volatility in trade policy is corrosive. As World Trade Organisation modelling suggests, if global tariffs rise and countries retaliate against the US, trade growth could reverse – falling from a projected 2.7 per cent gain this year to a decline of 0.5 per cent.

In a world already navigating inflation, instability and slowing demand, few economies can afford another self-inflicted slowdown.